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Beyond the Reach of Juvenile Justice:
The Crisis of Unaccompanied Immigrant
Children Detained by the United States
Areti Georgopoulos*
It is appalling that many officials don't understand the
difference between a juvenile offender and an unaccompanied
child, and that they deny these fragile young asylum seekers
respect and rights. This is grossly unfair to children whose
only "offense" is seeking safe haven in the US.
-Dr. William F. Schulz, Executive Director,
Amnesty International USA'

Introduction
Fifteen-year-old Isau fled his home in Honduras to escape
extreme physical abuse by his stepfather, persecution by
government death squads, and torment by youth gangs. 2 Isau's
stepfather beat Isau with rods, pieces of wood, and a machete
handle, and burned him with numerous hot objects. 3 After
running away from his stepfather's home, Isau lived on the streets
where he faced harassment from authorities and gangs. 4 He fled
to the United States and was apprehended by the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS).5 The INS denied Isau access to
* J.D. expected 2005, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1996, magna cum
laude, Brown University. I am grateful to my husband, Nidal Al-Ramahi, and to
my family for their undying support. I would like to thank Professor Barry Feld for
his inspiration and assistance and Dave Ahlvers and Kristine Kroenke for their
helpful comments on previous drafts of this Article.
1. First National Survey of Children in Immigration Detention Exposes
Mistreatment, Lengthy Detentions, Legal Barriers, NEWS RELEASE (Amnesty Int'l
USA), June 18, 2003, available at http://www.unityfirst.com/pressrelease
amnestyimmigration.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2004).
2. AMNESTY INT'L USA, UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION
http://www.amnestyusa.org/refugee/pdfs/childrenavailable at
14
(2003),
detention.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2004) (citing WOMEN'S COMMISSION FOR WOMEN
AND CHILDREN REFUGEES (2002); Interview by Amnesty with Isau, detainee, Berks
County Youth Center, Pa. (Sept. 2002); Amnesty Attorney Correspondence (Apr.
2003)).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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juvenile court, which could have deemed him eligible for long-term
foster care due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment 6 and allowed
him to remain lawfully in the United States.7 The INS then
detained him for over two years.8
In 2001, 5,385 unaccompanied 9 immigrant 10 children1 1 were
detained by the INS in the United States.12 Fleeing war, armed
rebel forces, political persecution, child slavery, abusive families,
and other perilous conditions in their native countries, or brought
by child traffickers, these children seek refuge in the United
14
States. 13 They are in need of care, assistance, and protection.
Arrested upon arrival, unaccompanied immigrant minors may be
held in immigration detention for months or years. 15 They are
held for administrative reasons, 16 not because they are charged
with any crime. 17
The INS has detained these children in a manner insensitive

6. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2000) (defining "special immigrant"
juvenile status and the relief it affords); see infra notes 211-215 and accompanying
text.
7. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h) (2003) (providing that a minor who fulfills the
applicable requirements of a "special immigrant" may apply for and adjust status).
8. AMNESTY INVL USA, supranote 2, at 14.
9. This Article will discuss the conditions of unaccompanied immigrant children
only. Although accompanied immigrant children suffer some of the same abuses,
an analysis of their situation is beyond the scope of this Article.
10. The term "immigrant" used to describe juveniles in this Article refers to nonnaturalized immigrants.
11. The terms "child(ren)," "juvenile(s)," and "minor(s)" will be used
interchangeably throughout this Article to refer to individuals under the age of
eighteen. This definition is consistent with the current definition of "child" under
the Homeland Security Act. See 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2)(B) (2003). But cf Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1), (c)(1) (2000) (defining "child" as
an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age").
12. AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2, at 1 (citing IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION
SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INS OFFICEE JUVENILE AFFAIRS FACT SHEET (2002)).
This figure is more than double the 1997 figure, which was 2,375. Id.
13. Id.
14. See id. at 2.
15. Id. at 1; see also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
UNACCOMPANIED JUVENILES IN INS CUSTODY, REP. NO. 1-2001-009, ch. 4 (2001),
(last
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/inspection/INS/01-09/chapter4.htm
visited Oct. 12, 2004) [hereinafter OIG Report] (explaining INS policies relating to
the length of time a minor can be held in custody before release).
16. The INA, codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2000), provides that
aliens entering the United States may be detained for unauthorized entry. Id. §
1231. This is an administrative, not a criminal, detention. Id.
17. AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2, at 1. This Article focuses on children who
are not delinquents or criminal offenders. A discussion of appropriate policies for
unaccompanied immigrant children who are delinquents or criminal offenders is
beyond the scope of this Article.
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to their needs and in violation of their rights.18 Human Rights
Watch has found INS policies and practices to be in contravention
of U.S. and international standards, 19 and has summarized its
findings as follows:
Nationwide, as many as one-third of children in INS detention
are placed in secure detention centers for juvenile offenders.
Often held with youth detained for committing violent crimes,
they are denied personal possessions and held in a severely
restricted, punitive environment. Children interviewed for
this report were handcuffed during transport, strip searched,
and subjected to other degrading treatment. We found that
too often, children in INS custody do not receive adequate
legal information or representation and are transferred
without the knowledge of their attorneys or families. Many
children are denied information about their detention or
education in a language that they understand and may be
confined for months at a time without direct access to a single
20
person with whom they can converse in their own language.
Unaccompanied immigrant children challenged INS policies
in a federal class action lawsuit, Reno v. Flores,21 the 1997
settlement of which established a new policy based on principles of
juvenile justice. 22 However, the INS stymied this policy by largely
Responsibility for the policy's
failing to implement it.23
implementation currently rests with the Office of Refugee
24
Resettlement.

18. See generally AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2 (describing immigration
detention of unaccompanied children). See infra Part 1.
19. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, DETAINED AND DEPRIVED OF RIGHTS: CHILDREN IN
THE CUSTODY OF THE U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, 10 HUM.
RTS. WATCH pt. III (1998), available at http:lhrw.orglreports98/ins2/(last visited
Sept. 24, 2004); HUM. RTS. WATCH, SLIPPING THROUGH THE CRACKS:
UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN DETAINED BY THE U.S. IMMIGRATION AND
available
at
SERVICE
pt.
IV
(1997),
NATURALIZATION
http://hrw.orglreports/1997/uscrcks (last visited Oct. 13, 2004). The 1998 report
was a follow-up investigation of the 1997 report. HUM. RTS. WATCH (1998), supra
pt. I. See infra note 175 (noting international conventions applicable to the rights
of detainees and children).
20. HUM. RTS. WATCH (1998), supra note 19, pt. I; see also id. pt. IV (describing
the conditions of confinement of detained children).
21. 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
22. See Stipulated Settlement Agreement, Flores v. Reno, 507 U.S. 292 (C.D. Cal.
1997) (Case No. CV 85-4544-RJK), available at http://www.centerforhumanrights
(last viewed Oct. 13, 2004)
.org/children/Document.2004-06-18.8124043749/
[hereinafter Stipulated Settlement Agreement]; infra Parts I.B, II.A.
23. See infra Part I.C.
24. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 279(a) (2003) (stating that the
care of unaccompanied children vested by statute in, or performed by, the INS is
transferred to the Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement of the Department
of Health and Human Services).
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This Article argues that federal legislation should establish a
policy for the treatment of unaccompanied immigrant minors
based on juvenile justice principles. Part I of this Article will
provide a background of immigration detention policies and
minors. 25
immigrant
unaccompanied
regarding
practices
Specifically, it will discuss the INS policy towards juveniles before
the Flores Agreement, 26 the terms of the Flores Agreement, 27 and
the failed implementation of its provisions. 28 Part II of this Article
will discuss legislative solutions to the ongoing crisis of the
29
It will
treatment of unaccompanied juvenile immigrants.
analyze the strengths of the proposed Unaccompanied Alien Child
Protection Act of 2003 (UACPA),30 which would incorporate
important protective policies for minors. 31 It will also discuss the
weaknesses of the UACPA, which would create a discretionary
32
system and provide no mechanism of policy enforcement.
Finally, this section will propose legislation modeled on federal
and state juvenile justice statutes, specifically providing for the
welfare of dependent children, and suggest an implementation
strategy to meet the needs and protect the rights of these
33
children.
I. Policies Toward Unaccompanied Immigrant Juveniles:
The 1980s to the Present
A. From No Policy to No Release: Juvenile Immigration
Detention Priorto Flores
Until March of 2003, the care of unaccompanied immigrant
minors rested with the INS. 34 The INS's primary function was to
police the nation's borders by arresting and deporting
35
unauthorized persons, including unaccompanied children.
Charged with providing custodial care to these children while also
25. See infra notes 34-169 and accompanying text.
26. See infra Part I.A.
27. See infra Part I.B.
28. See infra Part I.C.
29. See infra notes 170-290 and accompanying text.
30. S. 1129, 108th Cong. (2003).
31. See id.; infra Part II.B.
32. See infra Part I.B.
33. See infra Part I.C.
34. See 6 U.S.C. § 279(a) (2003).
35. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252c (2000) (authorizing the arrest of aliens); § 1231
(authorizing orders of detention and removal); § 1227 (describing deportable
aliens).
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seeking their removal from the United States, the INS faced a
serious conflict of interest. 36 In its dual role as the child's
caretaker and adversary, 37 the INS appeared ill-situated to protect
38
the rights and serve the needs of these minors.
The INS had no formal policy for the detention and release of
The Immigration and
unaccompanied minors before 1984. 39
Nationality Act 40 provided that aliens in custody, pending a
determination of deportability, could be released under bond or on
conditional parole at the discretion of the Attorney General. 41
However, the case of unaccompanied children was different. As
the Supreme Court has stated, "the INS cannot simply send
42
[immigrant juveniles] off into the night on bond or recognizance."
Prior to 1984, the release policy for minors was generally
governed by the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act
of 1974. 43 It authorized a juvenile's release "to his parents,
guardian, custodian, or other responsible party (including, but not
limited to, the director of a shelter-care facility)" upon certain
conditions. 44 Release was contingent on a promise by the receiving
party to bring the juvenile to court upon request. 45 Release could
be denied if the magistrate determined, after holding a hearing at
which the juvenile was represented by counsel, that "the detention
of such juvenile is required to secure his timely appearance before
46
the appropriate court or to insure his safety or that of others."

36. AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2, at 4; HuM. RTS. WATCH (1998), supra note
19, pt. I; HUM. RTS. WATCH (1997), supra note 19, pt. VI; Telephone Interview with
Carlos Holguin (Holguin), General Counsel, Center for Human Rights &
Constitutional Law (Oct. 3, 2003) (transcript on file with the author). Holguin
served as co-counsel for plaintiffs in the Reno v. Flores lawsuit, and continues to
represent the certified class of minors who are detained in U.S. immigration
custody. Id.
37. For example, the INS is the child's adversary in removal proceedings. See 8
U.S.C. § 1229 (2000) (describing removal proceedings).
38. See infra Part I.C.
39. HuM. RTS. WATCH (1997), supra note 19, pt. II; see Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S.
292, 324-25 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the history of INS detention
practices for immigrant juveniles).
40. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2000).
41. Id. § 1252(a)(1). The Board of Immigration Appeals had asserted that "[a]n
alien generally.., should not be detained or required to post bond except on a
finding that he is a threat to the national security ... or that he is a poor bail risk."
Flores, 507 U.S. at 295 (quoting Matter of Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. 666 (1976)).
42. Flores, 507 U.S. at 295.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 5034 (1992); Flores, 507 U.S. at 324-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(discussing the history of INS detention practices for immigrant juveniles).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 5034 (1992).
45. See id.
46. Id.
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In 1984, the Western Regional Office of the INS 4 7 adopted a
new release policy for minors. 4 The policy stated that "[njo minor
49
shall be released except to a parent or lawful guardian."
Exception would adhere only "in unusual and extraordinary
cases." 50 The result of this policy was an increase in the detention
of immigrant children, since few of them had a parent or guardian
available to accept their release, and few could meet the stringent
exception. 51
B. The Settlement Agreement of Flores v. Reno: A New
Policy
In 1985, a class-action lawsuit was filed against the INS
challenging its Western Region release policy and the conditions of
juveniles' detention. 52 The class included any person under the
age of eighteen detained in the legal custody of the INS.53 The

47. This region consisted of Washington, Oregon, California, Arizona, Nevada,
Hawaii, and Alaska. HUM. RTS. WATCH (1997), supra note 19, pt.II.
48. Flores,507 U.S. at 296.
49. Flores v. Meese, 934 F.2d 991, 994 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd en banc, 942 F.2d
1352 (9th Cir. 1991).
50. Id. In such circumstances, a juvenile could be released, at the discretion of
the District Directors and Chief Patrol Agents, to "a responsible individual who
agrees to provide care and be responsible for the welfare and well being of the
child." Id.
51. HuM. RTS. WATCH (1997), supra note 19, pt. II.
52. Flores v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Flores, 507 U.S. 292
at 298-99 (1993) (describing the Meese litigation and outcome). The case was
originally filed in the District Court for the Central District of California and was
decided after the INS codified its release policy in 1988. Flores, 507 U.S. at 298-99.
The codified INS policy authorized an alien juvenile to be released, at the INS's
discretion, to a parent, legal guardian, or adult relative not in INS custody. Id. at
297. The class argued that the INS release policy was unconstitutional, and that
the U.S. Constitution and U.S. immigration laws only required juveniles to be
released into the custody of "responsible adults." Id. at 294, 300. In a brief
unpublished order, the District Court ordered the INS to expand its release policy
to include the category of "other responsible adult party," and invalidated the
regulation in other respects. Id. at 299. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed the decision in 1990; in 1991, an en banc court vacated the
panel opinion and affirmed the District Court order in all respects. Id. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1993 on the issue of whether the INS
regulation, permitting the release of detained immigrant juveniles only to relatives
or legal guardians, was unconstitutional on its face. Id. at 299-300. The Court held
that the regulation did not facially violate the substantive Due Process Clause,
because the policy "is rationally connected to a governmental interest in 'preserving
and promoting the welfare of the child,' and is not punitive since it is not excessive
in relation to that valid purpose." Id. at 303 (citations omitted). The Court
reversed the en banc decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and remanded
the case. Id. at 315. Its settlement in 1997 produced the Flores Agreement. See
Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 22.
53. Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 22, pt. I, para. 4. Two
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1997 settlement agreement of Flores (hereinafter the Agreement)
created a nationwide policy that superceded all previous INS
policies inconsistent with its terms. 54 The Agreement sets forth
three main policies for the treatment, release, and detention of
minors in INS custody. 55 The INS is required to appropriately
train its employees and monitor their compliance with these
56
policies.
1. The Agreement's Treatment Policy Requires Special
Care for Minors
The Agreement establishes a sensitive treatment policy for
immigrant children based on their juvenile status. 57 The policy
provides that "[t]he INS treats, and shall continue to treat, all
minors in its custody with dignity, respect and special concern for
their particular vulnerability as minors."5 8 The INS must place
59
juveniles in safe and sanitary facilities following arrest.
Consistent with this policy, the INS must separate juveniles from
unrelated adults whenever possible. 60 The INS may place the

exceptions to this class are "any minor who has been determined to be emancipated
in an appropriate state judicial proceeding," id. pt. I, paras. 4, 5, and "an individual
who has been incarcerated due to a conviction for a criminal offense as an adult."
Id. pt. I, para. 4. See also infra notes 60 and 109 (discussing age determination
techniques).
54. Id. pt. II, para. 9. The Agreement was scheduled to terminate within five
years, or within three years after the court determines that the INS is in
substantial compliance with the Agreement. Id. pt. XIX, para. 40.
55. See id. pt. IV, para. 11 (stating general treatment and detention policy); pt.
VI, para. 14 (stating general release policy).
56. Id. pt. XIII, para. 34; pt. X, para. 28A. On an annual basis, an INS Juvenile
Coordinator must review, assess, and report the INS's compliance to the court. Id.
pt. X, para. 30. The Juvenile Coordinator must maintain an up-to-date record of all
juveniles placed in proceedings and remaining in INS custody for over seventy-two
hours. Id. pt. X, para. 28A. On a weekly basis, the Juvenile Coordinator must
collect statistical information on such minors from all INS district offices and
Border Patrol stations. Id. Statistical information must include at least the
following: (1) biographical information, e.g. each juvenile's name, date of birth, and
country of birth; (2) the date the juvenile was placed in INS custody; (3) each date
the juvenile was placed, removed, or released; (4) the sponsor to whom and the
place where the juvenile was placed, transferred, removed, or released; (5) the
juvenile's immigration status; and (6) the juvenile's hearing dates. Id.
57. See id. pt. IV, para. 11.
58. Id.; see also id. pt. V, para. 12 and pt. VIII, para. 25 for references to this
policy.
59. Id. pt. V, para. 12.
60. Id. The Agreement addresses the related issue of age determination for
apprehended persons who may be above eighteen years of age. See id. pt. V, para.
13. The appropriate provision provides:
If a reasonable person would conclude that an alien detained by the INS is
an adult despite his claims to be a minor, the INS shall treat the person as
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minor in an INS or INS-contracted detention facility with separate
accommodations for juveniles, or in a state or county juvenile
detention facility that separates detained minors from delinquent
6
offenders, if a minor cannot be immediately released. '
The Agreement also stipulates that unaccompanied minors
6 2 If
should not be transported in vehicles with detained adults.
adherence to this policy is impracticable, the Agreement provides
that "[t]he INS shall take necessary precautions for the protection
'63
of the well-being of such minors when transported with adults."
In addition, juveniles represented by counsel shall not be
transferred without advanced notice to their attorneys.6 4 This
provision aims to protect the relationship between detained
65
children and their counsel.
2. The Agreement's Release Policy Requires the Prompt
Release of Minors
The Agreement has a general release policy that requires the
INS to release a minor from its custody "without unnecessary
delay" to one of several parties. 66 These are, in order of preference:
A. a parent;
B. a legal guardian;
C. an adult relative... ;67
D. an adult individual or entity designated by the parent or
legal guardian as capable and willing to care for the minor's
well-being...

;68

an adult for all purposes, including confinement and release on bond or
recognizance. The INS may require the alien to submit to a medical or
dental examination conducted by a medical professional or to submit to
If the INS
other appropriate procedures to verify his or her age.
subsequently determines that such an individual is a minor, he or she will
be treated as a minor in accordance with this Agreement for all purposes.
Id. For a discussion of age determination techniques, see infra note 109.
61. Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 22, pt. V, para. 12. See infra
Part I.B.3. (discussing the reasons a minor may be detained by the INS).
62. Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 22, pt. VIII, para. 25.
63. Id.
64. Id. pt. IX, para. 27. Exceptions to this policy are "unusual and compelling
circumstances such as where the safety of the minor or others is threatened or the
minor has been determined to be an escape-risk, or where counsel has waived such
notice." Id. In such cases, counsel must be notified within 24 hours of transfer. Id.
65. See id.
66. Id. pt. VI, para. 14.
67. An adult relative is defined as a brother, sister, aunt, uncle, or grandparent.
Id.
68. This designation is confirmed by either "a declaration signed under penalty of
perjury before an immigration or consular officer or ... other document(s) that
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E. a licensed program 69 willing to accept legal custody; or
F. an adult individual or entity seeking custody, in the
discretion of the INS, when it appears that there is no other
likely alternative to long term detention and family
70
reunification does not appear to be a reasonable possibility.
The Agreement requires the INS to expeditiously process
minors in its custody and to provide them with a notice of rights. 71
Juveniles in INS custody must be transferred to a licensed
program within three to five days. 72 If there is "an emergency or
influx of minors into the United States,"'73 the Agreement provides
74
that juveniles shall be placed "as expeditiously as possible."
3. The Agreement's Detention Policy Requires the Least
Restrictive Setting
The Agreement's detention policy governs minors who cannot
be immediately released 75 This applies to children for whom
there is no appropriate sponsor and no licensed program available
for placement.7 6 In such cases, the Agreement provides that:
The INS shall place each detained minor in the least

establish(es) to the satisfaction of the INS, in its discretion, the affiant's paternity
or guardianship." Id.
69. The Agreement provides that a "licensed program" is "any program, agency
or organization that is licensed by an appropriate State agency to provide
residential, group, or foster care services for dependent children, including a
program operating group homes, foster homes, or facilities for special needs
minors." Id. pt. I, para. 6. A licensed program must also meet the 'Minimum
Standards for Licensed Programs" set forth in Exhibit 1 of the Agreement. Id.
Exhibit 1.
70. Id. pt. VI, para. 14.
71. Id. pt. V, para. 12. This "includ[es] the right to a bond redetermination
hearing if applicable." Id.
72. Id. The three-day provision applies "if the minor was apprehended in an INS
district in which a licensed program is located and has space available," while the
five-day provision applies "in all other cases." Id. The INS has five business days
to place the minor if he or she must be transported from an isolated area or speaks
an unusual language and an interpreter must be located to process the minor. Id.
73. An "emergency" is "defined as any act or event that prevents the placement of
minors" within the delineated time period, "[including] natural disasters ... facility
fires, civil disturbances, and medical emergencies." Id. pt. V, para. B. An "influx of
minors" is "defined as those circumstances where the INS has, at any given time,
more than 130 minors eligible for placement in a licensed program .... " Id. The
INS is required to have a written plan that sets out the "reasonable efforts it will
take to place all minors as expeditiously as possible" in the event of an emergency
or influx. Id. pt. V, para. C. This plan must include the designation of eighty beds,
licensed by an appropriate state agency, that may be available for INS placements.

Id.
74. Id. The Agreement does not define "expeditiously" further. See id.
75. Id. pt. IV, para. 11, pt. V, para. 12, pt. VII.
76. Id. pt. V, para. 12.
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restrictive setting appropriate to the minor's age and special
needs, provided that such setting is consistent with its
interests to ensure the minor's timely appearance before the
and to protect the minor's
INS and the immigration courts
77
well-being and that of others.
Thus, a detained juvenile should not be placed in a secure facility
78
if less restrictive alternatives are available and appropriate.
Examples of less restrictive alternatives are a medium security
facility, where intensive staff supervision and counseling services
79
All decisions to place
are available, or another licensed program.
and approved by the
be
reviewed
must
facility
a minor in a secure
80
regional Juvenile Coordinator.
The INS may continue to detain a minor under certain
circumstances. 8 ' These include circumstances where the juvenile
is delinquent,8 2 has committed or credibly threatened to commit a
violent or malicious act while in INS custody or in the presence of
an INS officer,8 3 or has engaged, while in a licensed program, in
"unacceptably disruptive" conduct.8 4 The INS may also detain a
85
minor if the INS determines he or she "is an escape-risk."
Finally, a minor may be held in a secure facility for his or her own
86
safety.

77. Id. pt. IV, para. 11.
78. Id. pt. VII, para. 23.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See id. pt. VII paras. 19, 21.
82. Id. pt. VII, para. 21.A. The Agreement provides that a minor may be held in
INS custody if the minor "has been charged with, is chargeable, or has been
convicted of a crime, or is the subject of delinquency proceedings, has been
adjudicated delinquent, or is chargeable with a delinquent act .... " Id. The
provision excludes minors whose offenses are isolated petty offenses. Id. pt. VII,
para. 21.A.i.
83. Id. pt. VII, para. 21.B.
84. Id. pt. VII, para. 21.C. The Agreement defines such conduct as
conduct that has proven to be unacceptably disruptive of the normal
functioning of the licensed program in which [the minor] has been placed
and [as a result] removal is necessary to ensure the welfare of the minor or
others, as determined by the staff of the licensed program (Examples:
drug or alcohol abuse, stealing, fighting, intimidation of others, etc. This
list is not exhaustive.).
Id.
85. Id. pt. VII, para. 21.D. "[E]scape-risk means there is a serious risk the minor
will attempt to escape from custody." Id. pt. VII, para. 22. Factors to be considered
when assessing whether a minor is an escape-risk include: whether the minor is
under a final deportation or exclusion order; the minor's immigration history; and
whether the minor has previously escaped or attempted to escape from INS
custody. Id.
86. Id. pt. VII, para. 21.E. One example is "when the INS has reason to believe
that a smuggler would abduct or coerce a particular minor to secure payment of
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Every juvenile the INS places in a facility or licensed
program is entitled to judicial review of his or her placement
decision.8 7
The INS must provide each detainee with an
explanation of the right of judicial review.88 In addition, the INS
must provide every juvenile not placed in a licensed program with
a notice of reasons for being placed in a detention or mediumsecurity facility.8 9 A minor may seek judicial review if she or he
disagrees with the INS's placement determination, or asserts that
the licensed program in which she or he was placed does not
comply with the standards set forth for licensed facilities. 90 The
INS is also required to give each detainee a "list of free legal
service providers, compiled pursuant to INS regulation...
C. The Problems with Implementing the Flores Agreement
Since the settlement of Flores, U.S. government and human
rights
reports
have documented
the mistreatment
of
unaccompanied immigrant minors in INS custody. 92 In 2001, the
Office of the Inspector General (OIG)93 in the Department of
Justice conducted a nation-wide evaluation of the INS's treatment,
release, and detention policies and practices developed in response
to the Agreement. 94 In brief, the results of the OIG Report are:
"Although the INS has made significant progress since signing the
Flores agreement, our review found that deficiencies in the

smuggling fees." Id.
87. Id. pt. VII, para. 24.B.
88. Id. pt. VII, para. 24.D(b). This explanation states:
The INS usually houses persons under the age of 18 in an open setting,
such as a foster home or group home, and not in detention facilities. If you
believe that you have not been properly placed or that you have been
treated improperly, you may ask a federal judge to review your case. You
may call a lawyer to help you do this. If you cannot afford a lawyer, you
may call one from the list of free legal services given to you with this form.
Id. Exhibit 6.
89. Id. pt. VII, para. 24.C.
90. Id. pt. VII, para. 24.B. These standards are set forth in Exhibit 1 of the
Agreement. See id. Exhibit 1.
91. Id. pt. VII, para. 24.D(c).
92. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 15; AMNESTY INT'L USA,
supra note 2; HUM. RTS. WATCH (1998), supra note 19; HUM. RTS. WATCH (1997),

supra note 19.
93. Evaluations and Inspections Division, Office of the Inspector General, U.S.
Department of Justice.
94. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 15, Executive Summary. The
OIG Report is comprised of five chapters. Id. Chapter One, Introduction, Chapter
Two, Compliance with Policies and Procedures, Chapter Four, Related Processes,
and Chapter Five, Recommendations, will be discussed in this Article. Chapter
Three, Program Oversight, is beyond the scope of this Article.
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handling of juveniles continue to exist in some INS districts,
Border Patrol sectors, and headquarters that could have
95
potentially serious consequences for the well-being of juveniles."
Human rights reports, the most recent of which was released by
Amnesty International USA (Amnesty) in 2003,96 corroborate the
97
OIG Report findings.
1. The INS Failed to Comply with the Agreement's
Treatment of Minors Policy
The OIG Report finds a deficiency of appropriate policies
regarding the treatment of minors. 98 One example is the INS's
failure to consistently separate non-delinquent juveniles from
delinquent juveniles housed in the same secure facility. 99 The
Agreement explicitly requires this separation when juveniles are
temporarily placed in an INS-contracted facility, 100 but INS policy
did not require such segregation once minors were formally placed
in secure detention. 1 1 According to the OIG Report, "[]ocal and
national advocacy groups cite the failure to segregate nondelinquent and delinquent juveniles as evidence that nondelinquent juveniles are unnecessarily imperiled. Some members
of Congress expressed this same concern and have proposed that
the INS relinquish custodial responsibility for unaccompanied
02
juveniles."
The OIG Report concludes that as a general problem, the INS
lacked clear and fully developed juvenile policies for custody
These include same-sex transport,
management issues. 10 3
documentation of transport and detention, escort upon release, use

95. Id. Executive Summary.
96. AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2.
97. See id.; HUM. RTS. WATCH (1998), supra note 19; HuM. RTS. WATCH (1997),
supra note 19. Information in these reports was gathered mainly from site visits to
immigrant juvenile shelters and detention facilities where interviews were
conducted with children, children's attorneys, immigration advocates, and local
facility directors. AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2, at 3-4; HUM. RTS. WATCH
(1998), supra note 19, pt. I; HUM. RTs. WATCH (1997), supra note 19, pt. I. The
Amnesty report also obtained information from a nationwide questionnaire,
immigration attorneys, and organizations working to assist unaccompanied
juvenile immigrants. AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2, at 3-4.
98. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 15, ch. 2.

99. Id.
100. See Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 22, pt. V, para. 12.
101. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 15, ch. 2.

102. Id.
103. Id.
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of restraints, and telephone access for juveniles in custody. 1 4 The
OIG Report discusses dangers arising from a lack of clear,
comprehensive policies in these areas. 10 5 For example, INS policy
stated that juveniles released from INS custody will be escorted,
yet some unaccompanied minors travel unescorted and risk being
kidnapped. 0 6 In addition, INS policy stated that secure facilities
holding juveniles do not have the authority to restrain minors, yet
several secure facilities had written policies that allowed staff to
handcuff and shackle juveniles, and routinely did so.107
Amnesty's report documents detention conditions which
contravene the Agreement's treatment policy.' 08 These include:
the commingling of immigrant children with juvenile offenders; 0 9
the use of excessive discipline, physical and verbal abuse, solitary
confinement, pat-down and strip searches, and restraints;" 0 and a
lack of access to exercise, open air, recreation, education, religious
services, mental health services, counsel,"' translators, and

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. ch. 2. One unaccompanied juvenile was released to the custody of
commercial airline personnel for safe passage from Phoenix, Arizona to New York
City, New York, and was abducted by kidnappers when he arrived at La Guardia
International Airport. Id.
107. Id.
108. See AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2, at 23-26, 29-43.
109. Id. at 29-43. Amnesty also reports that "children may be housed alongside
criminal adult suspects or inmates due to questionable age-determination
techniques and in some instances may even find themselves housed with adults,
even though the INS recognizes them as children." Id. at 26. Amnesty asserts that
U.S. immigration authorities overemphasize the accuracy of certain agedetermination techniques, such as dental or wrist-bone X rays. Id. According to
Amnesty, scientific studies have suggested that such techniques have a margin of
error of three years and "were never intended to be used for determining the exact
age of a child." Id. The unresolved issue of age determination techniques continues
to present a serious obstacle to the proper treatment of unaccompanied immigrant
children. See id. at 26-28. For an in-depth discussion of the issue and its current
status, see Jennifer Smythe, Age Determinationof UnaccompaniedAlien Children
and the Demand for Legislative Reform, 81 INTERPRETER RELEASES 753 (2004).
110. AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2, at 29-38. Amnesty discusses the use of
restraints during transportation, in the courtroom, and in detention facilities. Id.
at 34-36. The report also discusses the use of immobilizing restraints and chemical
restraints. Id. at 37-38.
111. Id. at 39-46. Immigrants facing removal proceedings have the right to
counsel. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(E) (2000). The OIG Report found that most
children did not have counsel for their removal proceedings before the Executive
Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note
15, ch. 4. Amnesty found that some of these children were not informed of their
right to counsel upon arrest, nor within weeks or months of their detainment. See
AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2, at 44-45. Amnesty also reports that a number
of children are placed in remote facilities, difficult for lawyers to access, and that
the INS often refuses to provide details about where children are housed to
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telephones.11 2 Of the facilities housing unaccompanied immigrant
children that responded to Amnesty's nationwide survey, only four
out of twenty-three secure facilities and only four shelter facilities
indicated that their staff are trained in the Agreement's treatment
standard.113

organizations offering pro bono legal services. Id. at 45-46. In addition, the INS's
transfer of minors from one facility to another impedes the development of an
attorney-client relationship. Id. at 47. Amnesty explains that "transfers often
undermine the child's legal case because they make effective communication with
the child difficult, and since essential case preparation time is interrupted, creates
[sic] problems for the already undersourced pro bono network." Id. Finally,
Amnesty notes that sometimes, children are transferred between facilities without
notification to their attorneys, which violates the Agreement. Id. at 48; see
Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 22, pt. IX, para. 27. It is important
to note that the children's lack of access to attorneys contributes to hearing delays.
AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2, at 65 ("One reason why immigration judges are
willing to delay hearings is for efforts to be made for the child to secure legal
representation"). Further analysis of the serious problems facing unaccompanied
immigrant children in EOIR hearings is beyond the scope of this Article. See
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 15, ch. 4 for a discussion of several
factors that contribute to the delay in deciding cases, including the limited
availability of legal representation, the postponement of hearing the merits of cases
pending the juveniles' release from custody, and the scheduling of detained minors
for non-expedited hearings. See also Christopher Nugent & Steven Schulman,
Giving Voice to the Vulnerable: On Representing Detained Immigrant and Refugee
Children, 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1569 (2001), for a discussion of the difficulties
immigrant children face in the EOIR hearings and the essential role of counsel.
112. AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2, at 49-51. Amnesty reports that thirteenyear-old Edwin Mufioz from Honduras
was held in a commingled facility, where he was locked in his cell for
approximately 18 hours a day, allowed out only a few hours a day for
classes and twice a day for 20 minutes in a fenced-in area for exercise. The
children had to walk silently with their hands crossed to avoid
punishment. He reports that both guards and other inmates mistreated
him. Edwin reported that the guards would break up fights using pepper
spray, which would also sting the eyes of the children not involved in the
fight. He was sprayed twice, making his eyes sting, and reports fearing he
would go blind.
Edwin reported losing weight and having frequent
nightmares in which the guards and other boys were going to kill him. "I
cried a lot in the cell wondering why everything was turning out so bad for
me in the United States and ifI would ever be free. "
Id. at 24 (citing Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigr. of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Edwin
Larios Mufioz)).
113. AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2, at 29. Thirty-three out of 115 facilities
reportedly used by immigration authorities to house unaccompanied children
participated in Amnesty's nationwide survey on immigrant juvenile policies,
twenty-three secure facilities and ten shelter facilities. Id. at 3. Of these facilities,
one "requested more information, and another responded that the question was 'not
applicable' to its facility." Id. at 29.
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2. The INS Failed to Comply with the Agreement's Prompt
Release Policy
The OIG Report finds the INS's juvenile release policy may
have impeded INS compliance with the prompt release
requirement. 114 The Agreement requires the release of minors
"without unnecessary delay" to one of several appropriate
sponsors. 1 5 However, INS policy was to not release a minor to
anyone other than a parent if the INS knew a parent was in the
United States." 6 Amnesty's report confirms this policy, stating:
"The National Juvenile Coordinator told [Amnesty] that children
must be released to a parent, held in INS custody, or be returned
7
home.""l
Additionally, the OIG Report finds that the INS also required
an undocumented parent or sponsor to appear before an INS
officer and to be served a Notice to Appear (NTA) before the minor
The NTA initiates immigrant removal
could be released." 8
proceedings." 9 If an undocumented parent did not come forward,
the minor remained in INS custody even if a close relative with
120
legal status was willing to accept custody of the child.
Immigration authorities confirmed this policy in Amnesty's
report.' 21 Since an undocumented parent or sponsor may not come
forward for fear of removal, the INS policy may have interfered
with the minor's expeditious release. 122 The OIG Report states
114. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 15, ch. 4; see Stipulated
Settlement Agreement, supra note 22, pt. VI, para. 14 (stating general release
policy); supra Part I.B.2.
115. Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supranote 22, pt. VI, para. 14.
116. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 15, ch. 4. The OIG Report notes
that the National Juvenile Coordinator confirmed this policy, and that "[h]e said
the policy has been communicated to the field and is clearly understood. However,
it has not been formally incorporated into the Juvenile Protocol Manual." Id. The
Juvenile Protocol Manual, developed by the INS Juvenile Program staff, defines
the policies, procedures, and responsibilities for INS officers handling juveniles. Id.
Executive Summary.
117. AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2, at 54.
118. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 15, ch. 4.
119. Id.; see 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229(a)(2004) (providing that the "notice to appear"
initiates removal proceedings).
120. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 15, ch. 4.
121. AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2, at 54. Immigration authorities in
Arizona stated that children whose parents did not come forward remained in
detention, even if a relative with legal status was willing to sponsor them. Id.
Amnesty also reported delays due to excessive paperwork required to process a
request for release, particularly for children from countries with a difficult
procedure for obtaining identification documentation. Id. at 54-55.
122. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 15, ch. 4; see also Stipulated
Settlement Agreement, supranote 22, pt. V, para. 12 (stating the INS is required to
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that "[p]ro bono legal and human rights organizations view this
policy as 'holding children hostage' or using them as 'bait' to draw
123
out the parents."
Another policy which hindered the release of juveniles was
the INS's home-assessment policy. 124 The OIG Report notes that
the INS required time-consuming home assessments for Chinese
and Indian juveniles, which greatly delayed release and
placement.' 25 Due to these assessments, Chinese and Indian
1 26
minors experienced longer detentions than other nationalities.
3. The INS Failed to Comply with the Agreement's
Detention Policy
The OIG Report finds the INS's release policy may have also
hindered INS compliance with the least restrictive setting
detention requirement. 27 The Agreement provides that if no
appropriate sponsor and no licensed program is immediately
available for placement, the INS "shall place each detained minor
in the least restrictive setting appropriate to the minor's age and
special needs .
,,"28 Most children whom the INS detained for
long periods remained there because the INS had not found
appropriate sponsors for them. 129 As a result of the INS's
restrictive release policy, children may have remained in custody
longer than necessary when an acceptable sponsor was
available. 130 In fiscal year 2000, the INS released to a sponsor 54
131
percent of juveniles detained in INS custody for over 72 hours.

"expeditiously process" minors in its custody); supra Part I.B.2.
123. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 15, ch. 4.
124. Id.
125. Id. The purpose of these assessments was reportedly to protect Chinese and
Indian minors from smugglers and to make sure any sponsors were legitimate. Id.
126. Id. In fiscal year 2000, the average length of detention for Chinese and
Indian immigrants was 146 days; for juveniles of other nationalities, it was twentynine days. Id. One Chinese juvenile was in INS custody for 631 days. Id.
127. Id. See Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 22, pt. IV, para. 11
(stating least restrictive setting placement policy); pt. V, para. 12 (stating
temporary placement policy).
128. Id. pt. IV, para. 11, pt. V, para. 12.
129. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 15, ch. 4.
130. Id.
131. Id. Specifically, the INS released to sponsors 2,238 of the 4,136 juveniles
detained in custody for over 72 hours. Id. The children who had been neither
released to sponsors nor retained in custody at the end of fiscal year 2000
experienced the following outcomes: 477 were given voluntary departure; 425 were
removed; 282 turned eighteen years of age and were subsequently treated as
adults; and the remaining 205 experienced miscellaneous consequences, including
running away. Id. n.34.
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Of these juveniles, the INS released 50 percent within three weeks
132
However, of
of apprehension, and 60 percent within four weeks.
who
sponsor
to
a
released
eventually
the 40 percent of children
percent
7
detained
INS
the
weeks,
four
were still in custody after
for over six months, and 1 percent for over a year. 133
In addition, Amnesty's report finds that "the INS overused
secure detention and failed to place many children in the 'least
restrictive setting required by Flores."'134 According to Amnesty,
"approximately one-third [of children in immigration custody] are
detained in harsh conditions in a secure jail-like facility designed
135
for the incarceration of juvenile offenders.
In response to its principal findings, the OIG Report makes
numerous recommendations. 36 First, the INS should implement
various procedures to protect minors, 137 and the INS should
continue to segregate juvenile non-offenders from offenders as long
as the juveniles are in INS custody. 38 Specific procedures should

132. Id.
133. Id.
134. AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2, at 18 (quoting Stipulated Settlement
Agreement, supra note 22, Exhibit 2(b)); see Stipulated Settlement Agreement,
Amnesty reports that the INS identified
supra note 22, pt. IV, para. 11.
"emergency influx" as the reason for holding most children in secure facilities for
more than seventy-two hours. AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2, at 22. The
Agreement defines "emergency influx" as a time when there are more than 131
children in need of non-secure bed space. Id. This figure was based on the fact
that the INS had 131 available non-secure bed spaces in 1997 at the time the
Agreement was reached. Id. In 2002, the INS had almost 500 non-secure bed
spaces, nearly four times as many as it had in 1997. Id. (citing Hearings, supra
note 112 (testimony of Stuart Anderson, Executive Associate Commissioner, U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service)). Despite the dramatic increase in nonsecure bed spaces, the INS used the 1997 figure of 131 available bed spaces to
characterize every year as an "influx" and thus justify its use of secure detention
for juveniles. Id.
135. AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2, at 1 (citing IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION
SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., INS OFFICE OF JUVENILE AFFAIRS FACT SHEET (2002)).

It is worth noting that while Human Rights Watch and Amnesty both report that
one-third of juveniles were detained in secure facilities, the number of juvenile
immigrant detainees had more than doubled in the five years between their
reports. See id; see also HUM. RTS. WATCH (1998), supra note 19, pt.I.
136. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supranote 15, ch. 5.
137. See id.
138. Id. The formal recommendation is:
The INS should include and enforce standards in all contracts with secure
detention facilities that require the segregation of non-delinquent INS
juveniles from delinquent juveniles. These standards should provide for
strict segregation in living quarters and no more than minimal contact in
all other common areas. The facilities should be required to immediately
notify the INS if they cannot meet this requirement so the INS can take
immediate corrective action.
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require:
same-sex escort of juveniles; records with sufficient
accountability of juvenile transportation and detention for all
juveniles in custody of the Border Patrol districts; maintenance of
physical custody of escorted minors until they are released to a
sponsor; implementation of specific rules that govern the use of
restraints on juveniles; and a revised policy ensuring juveniles
have access to telephones. 139 Second, the INS should allow district
directors discretion and provide them with guidance for the release
of minors to a responsible sponsor if a parent is unwilling to
appear.140 Third, the INS should evaluate and streamline the
home-assessment process. 141 Finally, the INS should implement
procedures that require monitoring and regular reporting of noncompliance with the placement requirement, including the
42
reporting of justifications for overdue placements.
Amnesty's report makes extensive recommendations based on
its findings. 143 In sum, Amnesty urges the U.S. government to
stop the routine detention of unaccompanied immigrant
children.144 Amnesty asserts that these children should only be
detained "as a last resort for the shortest possible time and in a
facility appropriate to their needs." 145 In addition, Amnesty urges
the Office of Refugee Resettlement to review all facilities housing
unaccompanied children and to demand that any facility violating
international law or the terms of the Agreement should rectify its
violations or lose its contract. 146
The Agreement requires the INS to promulgate regulations
incorporating the Agreement's substantive terms within 120 days
147
Almost
of the final district court's approval of the settlement.
five years later, and a few months before the Agreement was set to
expire, the INS had not promulgated any regulations.148 In

139. Id. The OIG Report notes that policies and procedures help "to protect
juveniles from excessive restraint." Id. ch. 2.
140. See id. ch. 5.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2, at 77-83. The recommendations are
addressed to the U.S. government, the Department of Homeland Security, the
Office of Refuge Resettlement, the immigration courts, and the international
community. Id.
144. See id. at 77.
145. Id.
146. Id. For more information about the role of the Office of Refugee
Resettlement in administering the care of unaccompanied immigrant children, see
infra notes 152, 156, 163-169 and accompanying text.
147. Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 22, pt. II, para. 9.
148. AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2, at 17.
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December, 2001, the Central District Court of California extended
the Agreement, by stipulation with the INS, until 45 days after the
INS adopts the Agreement's substantive provisions into final
regulations. 149 Since the INS never adopted final regulations, the
Agreement remains in effect. 150
D. The Problems with the Current Care of Unaccompanied
Immigrant Children Under the Office of Refugee
Resettlement
Recently, the Homeland Security Act (HSA)151 transferred
the care of unaccompanied immigrant children from the INS to the
Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR).15 2 The HSA also abolished
the INS 153 and transferred its immigration law enforcement duties
to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).154 At first glance,
the transfer of care-taking and law enforcement duties to two
separate agencies obviates the conflict of interest inherent in the
former INS. 155 The ORR, a social service agency whose main
function is to help refugees establish sustainable lives in the
United States,156 appears to be better suited to meet the needs of
these children. However, there are several reasons why it is
unlikely that the conditions of unaccompanied juvenile detainees

149. Id. (citing Flores v. Ashcroft, Stipulation and Order, Case No. 85-4544-RJK
(C.D. Cal. 2001)).
150. See id.
151. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, § 116 Stat. 2202 (2002).
152. 6 U.S.C. § 279(a) (2003). The change was effective March 1, 2003. AMNESTY
INT'L USA, supra note 2, at 5.
153. 6 U.S.C. § 291 (2003).
154. Id. § 251. The HSA transferred immigration functions originally delegated
to the Attorney General by the INA to the Secretary of Homeland Security. DAVID
WEISSBRODT & LAURA DANIELSON, IMMIGRATION LAW IN A NUTSHELL ch. 3, § 3
(2004), at http://wwwl.umn.edulhumanrts/immigrationlaw/index.html (last visited
Sept. 25, 2004). These functions are now handled by three subdivisions of the DHS:
(1) the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), which reviews petitions
for immigration, adjustment of status, naturalization, and refugee and asylum
applications; (2) the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which is
responsible for the enforcement of immigration laws within the United States, and
operates immigration investigations, detention, removal, and intelligence
programs; and (3) the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which is
responsible for preventing illegal entries into the United States. Id.
155. This conflict arose from the INS's duty to simultaneously care for and seek
removal of unaccompanied minors. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
156. OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, ELIGIBILITY FOR REFUGEE ASSISTANCE
AND SERVICES THROUGH THE OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/geninfo/index.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2004).
The ORR falls under the Department of Health and Human Services, and its
mission is "to assist refugees and other special populations ... in obtaining
economic and social self-sufficiency in their new homes in the United States." Id.
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will improve significantly.
First, the law enforcement agencies of the DHS retain
significant control over the treatment of unaccompanied
immigrant minors. 157 This is evident in the operation of arrest
and detainment procedures.
Officials from the Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) initially encounter undocumented,
unaccompanied children at ports of entry, such as airports, at
border crossings, or within the United States. 58 The children are
then referred to the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),
which detains them and places them in removal proceedings
before the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR).159 The
ICE must transfer custody of these detained children to the ORR
in order for them to receive appropriate care and placement.
However, because the HSA failed to specify a time frame for the
transfer of custody, these children could remain in ICE custody
157. See AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2, at 75-76. Holguin has aptly observed
that there is an asymmetry of power between the DHS and the ORR which severely
limits the ORR's ability to actualize its mission. Telephone Interview with
Holguin, supra note 36. Holguin describes the DHS as a "huge, powerful agency,"
with a lot of bureaucratic clout, which "calls the shots." Id. He describes the ORR
as its "junior partner." Id. This relationship is evidenced in a recent agreement
reached between the DHS and the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) on a "Statement of Principles" regarding the Unaccompanied Alien
Children Program.
See DHS, HHS Reach Agreement on Improved Care for
Unaccompanied Children, 81 No. 15 INTERPRETER RELEASES 494, 497-98 (2004)
[hereinafter Statement of Principles]. The Statement of Principles notes that
functions related to unaccompanied immigrant minors have been divided between
the two agencies, with the DHS responsible for immigration benefits and
enforcement, and the ORR responsible for care and placement. Id at 497.
However, the Statement of Principles emphasizes that the two agencies will work
in conjunction to execute these functions. Id at 498. For example, although the
ORR will be responsible for determining whether a child will be released to a
custodian until removal is imminent, the Statement of Principles stipulates that
"[iun making this determination, ORR will consult with DHS." Id. In fact, the
agencies plan to consult with each other on the development of procedures, to
conduct joint reviews, and to meet regularly to discuss day-to-day operations. Id.
This calls into question the assertion made by Jessica G. Taverna that the ORR is
"an agency that has complete independence from the DHS." Jessica G. Taverna,
Note, Did the Government Finally Get It Right? An Analysis of the Former INS, the
Office of Refugee Resettlement and Unaccompanied Minor Aliens' Due Process
Rights, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 939, 968 (2004).
158. AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2, at 75. See Nugent & Schulman, supra
note 111, at 1569. Children apprehended within the United States are detained
after crossing the border without inspection, sometimes years after entry. Id.
159. Nugent & Schulman, supra note 111, at 1569; AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra
note 2, at 75. ICE is responsible for the enforcement of immigration laws, and
therefore operates immigration detention and removal programs. See supra note
154. The EOIR is an administrative body within the Department of Justice that
oversees immigration adjudication. See WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note
154, ch. 3, § 3-3. The EOIR includes the immigration courts and the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA). Id.
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is
nearly
ICE
custody
Furthermore,
indefinitely. 1 60
indistinguishable from INS custody.1 61 The ICE is operated by
former INS personnel who work out of established INS district
162
offices where staff and facilities remain largely unchanged.
Second, the ORR operates in the shadow of INS policies and
practices, 163 many of which continue in contravention of the Flores
Agreement. 6 4 As Amnesty notes, "the ORR has inherited a
detention system that reflects the law enforcement culture of the
INS .... The entire contracted network of at least 115 facilities
used by the former INS to house unaccompanied children ...has
been transferred to the ORR."165 This entrenched and problematic
system will hinder the ORR's successful administration of its
167
resources 166 to unaccompanied immigrant children.

160. See 6 U.S.C. § 279. See AMNESTY INTL USA, supra note 2, at 75-76.
161. Telephone Interview with Holguin, supra note 36; see AMNESTY INT'L USA,
supra note 2, at 76.
162. See AMNESTY INT'L USA, supranote 2, at 76.
163. Id. at 74.
164. See supra Part I.C. See generally AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2
(discussing the lack of Floresimplementation in 2003).
165. AMNESTY INT'L USA, supranote 2, at 74.
166. The ORR operates an Unaccompanied Refugee Minors Program for
identified refugee children living abroad who are eligible for resettlement in the
United States. See OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, THE UNACCOMPANIED
REFUGEE MINORS PROGRAM, at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/programs
/urm.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2004). Children receive foster care under the
program which "establishes legal responsibility, under State law, to ensure that
unaccompanied minor refugees and entrants receive the full range of assistance,
care, and services to which all children in the State are required; a legal authority
is designated to act in place of the child's unavailable parent(s)." Id. The ORR
could help unaccompanied immigrant juvenile detainees by increasing the number
of minors placed in foster care rather than secure detention. Amnesty reports that
the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service (LIRS) and the U.S. Conference of
Catholic Bishops (USCCB) have provided foster care to unaccompanied minors.
AMNESTY INT'L USA, supranote 2, at 19. Amnesty states:
The organizations assess that there is a far wider availability of foster care
settings and point out that foster care ($55 per day) is much cheaper than
detention ($200 per day). Nevertheless, [the INS] placed only sixteen
children in foster care in 2001. The INS cited security concerns and the
likelihood of the children absconding as reasons for not placing more in
foster care. However, LIRS and USCCB have reported that, in their
experience, children do not abscond if appropriate services are in place to
ensure that they are safe and cared for.
Id. (citation omitted) (citing Hearings, supra note 112 (testimony of Julianne
Duncan, Director of Children's Services for Migration and Refugee services, U.S.
Conference of Catholic Bishops)). The ORR could also help link these children to
important state resources, such as English language classes, health and mental
services, and adjustment training programs. See http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs
/orr/programs/urm.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2004).
167. There is disagreement among commentators about whether the transfer of
functions to the ORR will substantively improve the treatment and care of
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Third, inadequate funding impedes the ORR's ability to
institute change.
By its own accounts, the ORR is grossly
underfunded. 16 Assigned a multitude of duties related to the care
and placement of unaccompanied immigrant children, the
monitoring of facilities, and the maintenance of statistical data, 169

unaccompanied immigrant minors.
For example, Nugent and Schulman are
optimistic about the improvement of conditions for these children under the ORR.
See Christopher Nugent & Steven Schulman, A New Era in the Legal Treatment of
Alien Children: The Homeland Security and Child Status ProtectionActs, 80 No. 7
INTERPRETER RELEASES 233, 233-38 (2003). Nugent and Schulman conclude that
because the HSA mandates the ORR "to 'ensure that the interests of the child are
considered in decisions and actions relating to the care and custody of an
unaccompanied alien child[,]' [t]he overhaul thus promises a more child-friendly
atmosphere and treatment for unaccompanied alien children pending their
immigration proceedings." (citation omitted). Id. In contrast, Carolyn J. Seugling
warns that "[allthough transferring unaccompanied minors' care and custody from
the INS to the DHHS [Department of Health and Human Services] was part of the
largest reorganization of the U.S. government in the last fifty years, reorganization
is not a substitute for necessary substantive reforms." Carolyn J. Seugling, Note,
Toward a Comprehensive Response to the Transnational Migration of
Unaccompanied Minors in the United States, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 861, 866
(2004).
See also supra note 157 (discussing Holguin's observation that the
asymmetry of power between the DHS and the ORR severely limits the ORR's
ability to actualize its mission).
168. See 149 CONG. REC. S11,321 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 2003) (statement of Sen.
Feinstein) ("In talking with experts who work with these children as well as with
[ORR] officials, it has become evident that [the program for unaccompanied alien
children] will need at least $20 million in additional funding in order to operate
effectively in fiscal year 2004."). Senator Feinstein declined to offer an amendment
that would appropriate the additional twenty million and bring the total
appropriation to $54.227 million. See id. ("In the interest of time and in deference
to the delicate balance that the committee was forced to achieve in putting together
this bill, I will not offer this amendment at this time"). See also AMNESTY INT'L
USA, supra note 2, at 74 (stating that "[Amnesty] is concerned that ORR will be
hindered in its efforts due to lack of funding: ORR has a very limited budget and a
skeleton staff to address the substantial challenges that it faces .... ").
169. See 6 U.S.C. § 279(a)(1). In general, the Director of the ORR is responsible
for:
(A) coordinating and implementing the care and placement of
unaccompanied alien children... ;
(B) ensuring that the interests of the child are considered...;
(C) making placement determinations for all ... children ...
(D) implementing the placement determinations;
(E) implementing policies with respect to the care and placement...
(F) identifying a sufficient number of qualified individuals, entities, and
facilities to house [the] children;
(G) overseeing the infrastructure and personnel of facilities in which
[the] children reside;
(H) reuniting.., children with a parent abroad in appropriate cases;
(I) compiling, updating, and publishing at least annually a state-by-state
list of professionals or other entities qualified to provide guardian and
attorney representation services for unaccompanied alien children;
(J) maintaining statistical information and other data on...
children... ;
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the ORR has the hefty task of executing and reforming existing
policies. Without sufficient funding by the federal government, it
is unlikely that the ORR will be able to acquire a powerful agency
status, fulfill its duties, or actualize significant change.
II. A Persistently Grievous National Policy and Proposals
for Its Reform
The INS's failure to implement the policies required by the
Flores Agreement has perpetuated the mistreatment of
unaccompanied immigrant minors in the United States. Under
the practices of U.S. immigration authorities, these children are
171
systematically deprived of due process 170 and human rights
entitled to them under the U.S. Constitution,17 2 U.S. statutory
provisions, 173 U.S. court orders, 174 and international human rights

(K) collecting and compiling statistical information from the Department
of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of
State on each department's actions relating to unaccompanied alien
children; and
(L) conducting investigations and inspections of facilities and other
entities in which unaccompanied alien children reside.
Id.
170. For an insightful analysis of the government's failure to provide
unaccompanied immigrant children due process protection against indefinite
detention, see Taverna, supranote 157.
171. See generally AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2; HUM. RTS. WATCH (1997),
supra note 19; HUM. RTS. WATCH (1998), supra note 19; OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GEN., supra note 15. See also AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2, at 38-44, 49-51.
172. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
provide that no "person" shall be deprived "of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court has found
this protection applicable to children. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979)
(stating that "[a] child, merely on account of his minority, is not beyond the
protection of the Constitution"); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (declaring that
"[n]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone").
The Supreme Court has also established that noncitizens are entitled to due
process protections. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1981) (declaring that
"[wihatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is a 'person' in any
ordinary sense of that term. Aliens, even aliens whose presence in this country is
unlawful, have long been recognized as 'persons' guaranteed due process of law by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments").
173. The INA provides that an alien shall be given notice of removal proceedings
against him or her, the nature and legal basis of these proceedings, and his or her
right to counsel. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) (2000). The INA further provides that
an alien in removal proceedings has the right to be represented by counsel, to
examine the evidence against him or her, to present evidence on his or her behalf,
to cross-examine witnesses, and requires that a complete record of the proceeding
be produced. See id. § 1229a(a)(4).
174. See Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 22; see also supra Part
I.B.
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provisions. 175 The denial of these rights is lamentable, unjustified,
and must desist.
Improving the treatment of unaccompanied children in
immigration custody requires Congress to take three essential
steps. First, Congress must create a more protective federal policy
for the care, detention, and release of these minors that fully
incorporates the principles of juvenile justice. Second, Congress
must create an effective means of implementing this policy by
delegating the task to an appropriate and sufficiently empowered
federal agency. 176 Third, Congress must create effective oversight
of the policy's implementation. This section will present a strong
policy based on juvenile justice principles and discuss two
legislative proposals to improve the treatment of unaccompanied
immigrant minors.

175. See The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res
2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966)
(protecting human rights of detainees); the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex,
U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) (protecting human
rights of detainees); the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A.
Res. 44/25, Annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 49, at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989)
(protecting human rights of children); the United Nations Rules for the Protection
of Juveniles Deprived of Their Liberty, G.A. Res. 45/113, Annex, 45 U.N. GAOR
Supp. No. 49A, at 205, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990) (protecting human rights of
children); the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Note on Policies
and Procedures in Dealing with Unaccompanied Children Seeking Asylum, July
1997; the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Refugee Children:
Guidelines on Protection and Care (1994), available at http://www.asylumsupport.
See also Claire L. Workman, Note,
info/publications/unhcr/refugeechildren.pdf.
Kids Are People Too: Empowering Unaccompanied Minor Aliens Through
Legislative Reform, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 223, 235-38 (2004)
(discussing international legal principles regarding unaccompanied immigrant
minors); AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2, at 7-11 (discussing the application of
international law and standards to children); HUM. RTS. WATCH (1997), supra note
19, pt. II (summarizing the rights of children in confinement established by
international guidelines); HUM. RTS. WATCH (1998), supra note 19, pt. II
(discussing international standards applicable to children in INS custody).
176. Holguin proposes that:
[Tihe degree to which nominal juvenile detention standards will be
observed in practice depends on (1) the quantity and quality of
governmental resources allocated to compliance (institutional capacity), (2)
the amount of specificity in nominal standards (ambiguity), and (3) where
the locus of enforcement responsibility is placed (e.g., an independent child
protection agency versus the INS) (conflict and institutional commitment
to nominal goals).
Carlos Holguin, Failed by Federalism: Ad Hoc Policy-Making Towards Detained
Immigrant and Refugee Children 8 (Aug. 2001) (unpublished paper), at
(last visited
http://centerforhumanrights.org/children/MinorsPolicyAnalysis.pdf
Oct. 25, 2004) [hereinafter Holguin].

2005]

BEYOND THE REACH OFJUVENILE JUSTICE

141

A. A More Protective Policy Towards Unaccompanied
Immigrant Children Should Fully Incorporate the
Principlesof Juvenile Justice
The policies of the Flores Agreement are based on juvenile
justice principles. 177
The Agreement's standards for the
treatment, release, and detention of unaccompanied immigrant
minors reflect juvenile justice policies codified in federal and state
legislation. 178 These principles should be fully incorporated into
179
an improved policy for the care of these children.
The Agreement's treatment policy reflects a founding
principle of the juvenile justice system. 80 The policy directs that
federal agencies' 8' shall treat children in their custody "with
dignity, respect and special concern for their particular
vulnerability as minors."i8 2
The notion that children are
vulnerable and in need of care and guardianship gave rise to the
juvenile justice system. 8 3 The legal doctrine of parens patriae,
State as parent, has authorized the State's intervention on behalf

177. See generally BARRY C. FELD, JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION (2000)
(discussing the principles and practices of juvenile justice); BARRY C. FELD, BAD
KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT (1999) (describing
the evolution of the juvenile court concept).
178. See FELD (2000), supra note 177, ch. 1 (discussing the origins of the juvenile
justice system); ch. 5 (discussing pretrial detention); ch. 8 (discussing dispositional
decisions).
179. The incorporation of juvenile justice principles in a policy towards
immigrant minors is especially important because "child refugees may be
traumatized by conditions of persecution they are fleeing and may be
retraumatized by their conditions of confinement." Nugent & Schulman, supra
note 111, at 1570.
180. See FELD (2000), supra note 177, ch. 1.
181. The policy was originally addressed to the INS, but since its dissolution in
2002, several federal agencies are now responsible for the detention, custody, and
care of unaccompanied immigrant minors.
See supra notes 151-160 and
accompanying text.
182. Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supranote 22, pt. IV, para. 11.
183. See FELD (2000), supra note 177, at 1-3. The perception of children as
vulnerable emerged at the end of the nineteenth century. See id. at 1-2 (stating
that "[b]y the end of the nineteenth century ... people increasingly viewed children
as vulnerable, innocent, passive, and dependent beings ....); see also Janet E.
Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case
for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1094, 1095 (1991)
(describing the emergence of "the belief that children are essentially different from
adults," and stating that children "were assumed to be vulnerable, malleable, and
in need of adult guidance .. ").Many commentators assert that children require
special care because of their youth. See, e.g., Nugent & Schulman, supra note 111,
at 1569 ("Detained children are not and should not be treated as 'adults in
miniature,' as they have unique vulnerabilities and special needs related to their
collective condition and individual backgrounds as children.")
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of children lacking adequate parental protection.18 4 As the U.S.
Supreme Court has acknowledged, "[t]he State has 'a parens
patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the
child."' 18 5 An example of a state statute reflecting this interest is
the Texas Family Code.18 6 It lists as one of its purposes "to provide
for the care, the protection, and the wholesome moral, mental, ' and
7
physical development of children coming within its provisions."'1
As part of its original purpose "to improve the quality of
88
the federal Juvenile
juvenile justice in the United States,"'
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA) mandates the
89
The JJDPA
de-institutionalization of non-criminal juveniles.
requires that juveniles who have not committed a criminal offense
not be detained in secure institutions.' 90 The JJDPA specifically
provides that non-offending minors who are non-naturalized
immigrants or alleged to be dependent, neglected, or abused "shall
not be placed in secure detention facilities or secure correctional
find alternatives to
facilities."' 9 1 The JJDPA encourages states to
92
juvenile detention and correctional facilities.1
The Agreement's release policy is consistent with the

184. FELD (2000), supra note 177, at 2; see also Ainsworth, supra note 183, at
1098 (stating that "[t]he idea that the peculiar vulnerability of children justified
state control over them was analogized to the well-established chancery court
principle, parenspatriae,which gave the state authority over parentless children").
185. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984) (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 766 (1971)); see also FELD (2000), supra note 177, at 2 (explaining that
"[t]heoretically, a child's 'best interests,' background, and welfare guided
dispositions").
186. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 51.01(3) (1997).
187. Id.
188. Juvenile and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-415, 42
U.S.C. § 5601, § 102(B)(3) (1974).
189.42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(11) (1974). The Act also listed as one of its purposes "to
develop and conduct effective programs ... to provide critically needed alternatives
to institutionalization." Pub. L. No. 93-415, § 102(B)(2). See also FELD (2000),
supra note 177, at 865-66 (discussing the enactment of the JJDPA and its purpose
to deinstitutionalize status and non-criminal offenders).
190. 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(11). The Act predicates the dispersal of federal funds to
states upon their compliance with this requirement. Id. A state failing to
deinstitutionalize status and non-criminal offenders will lose its eligibility to
receive federal funds under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
program. Id. § 5633(c).
191. Id. § 5633(a)(11)(B).
192. See id. § 5633(a)(9)(A) (stating that federal funds shall be used for
"community-based alternatives ... to incarceration and institutionalization"). The
JJDPA also requires that allegedly delinquent juveniles shall be detained in a
foster home or community-based facility whenever possible, shall not be detained in
an institution in which they have contact with adult inmates, and shall be kept
separate from adjudicated delinquents whenever possible. 18 U.S.C. § 5035 (2003).
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JJDPA's mandate that non-criminal juveniles should not be
194
institutionalized. 1 93 It requires the appropriate federal agency
to release "a minor from its custody without unnecessary delay" to
one of several parties 95 in order to avoid institutionalization. The
federal agency may detain minors only under certain
circumstances, 1 96 and in such cases it must place juveniles in the
"least restrictive setting appropriate to the minor's age and special
97

needs."1

The Agreement's "least restrictive" detention policy comports
with state standards for the detention and disposition of
juveniles. 198 For example, Michigan court rules mandate that a
detained juvenile awaiting disposition be placed in the "least
restrictive environment" that satisfies the needs of the minor and
the public. 199 Similarly, West Virginia's statute for the disposition
of status offenders 200 provides that "[i]n ordering any further
disposition under this section, the court is not limited to the relief
sought in the department's petition and shall make every effort to
place juveniles in community-based facilities which are the least
restrictive alternatives appropriate to the needs of the juvenile
201
and the community."
A more protective policy towards unaccompanied immigrant
children should incorporate additional aspects of the juvenile
justice system. One asset of juvenile courts is their exercise of
jurisdiction over dependent and neglected children. 202 Serving as
a liaison for minors in need of child welfare services, juvenile court
judges connect children with appropriate resources.
An
unaccompanied immigrant child would come under juvenile court
jurisdiction in most states because she lacks the protection of
parents, legal guardians, a home, and has often suffered abuse or

193. See 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(ll)(B) (2003); Stipulated Settlement Agreement,
supra note 22, pt. VI, para. 14.
194. See supra note 181.
195. Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 22, pt. VI, para. 14.
196. See Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 22, pt. V, para. 12; pt. VII;
supra Part I.B.3.
197. Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 22, pt. IV, para. 11.
198. See MICH. R. SPEC. P. M.C.R. 3.935(D)(4) (2003); W. VA. ST. § 49-5-11a(c)
(1998).
199. MICH. R. SPEC. P. M.C.R. 3.935(D)(4).
200. A status offender is a juvenile who engages in behavior permissible for
adults yet prohibited for juveniles simply because of their age, such as alcohol
consumption. FELD (2000), supra note 177, at 84.
201. W. VA. ST. § 49-5-1la(c).

202. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 260C.007(6) (2003) (defining a dependent or
neglected child); § 260C.101(1) (2003) (declaring jurisdiction over such a child).
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States may call such a child "dependent," 20 4 or
trauma. 20 3
"neglected," a "child in need of assistance" (CINA), 20 5 or a "child in
For example,
need of protection or services" (CHIPS).206
Minnesota's statutory definition of such a child is:
Child in need of protection or services means a child who is in
need of protection or services because the child:
(1) is abandoned or without parent, guardian, or custodian;
(2)(i) has been a victim of physical or sexual abuse... ;
(3) is without necessary food, clothing, shelter, education, or
other required care for the child's physical or mental health or
morals because the child's parent, guardian, or custodian is
unable or unwilling to provide that care;
(13) is a runaway.

20 7

Although unaccompanied immigrant minors would qualify for
child welfare resources under state statutes, these minors usually
do not receive such services. 20 8 One reason is that juvenile courts
20 9
administer child welfare through state and local governments
and immigrant children in federal custody are segregated from
these systems. 210 Another reason is that the federal government
provides immigrant minors with limited opportunity to access
juvenile courts. 211 One provision of the INA permits a child to
qualify as a "special immigrant" 212 partly based on a juvenile
court's assessment of the child's need for services. 213 A special

203. See MINN. STAT. § 260C.101(1) (stating that "[t]he juvenile court has
original and exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings concerning any child who is
alleged to be in need of protection or services").
204. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(14) (2000).
205. See MD. CTS. & JUD.PROC. § 3-801(f) (2001).
206. See MINN. STAT. § 260C.007(6).
207. Id.
208. See Holguin, supra note 176, at 19 (observing that "[s]tate child welfare
agencies have almost uniformly declined to play any meaningful role in protecting
minors in INS custody .... [S]tate child welfare authorities are uncertain of their
jurisdiction over minors whom the INS is actively moving to deport").
209. See generally FELD (2000), supranote 177.
210. Nugent and Schulman have observed that "[t]he immigration legal
system . . . treats children as aliens first and foremost, subject to the framework of
immigration law." Nugent & Schulman, supra note 111, at 1570. For a comparison
of this approach to the Western European and Canadian systems, which employ
the "best interests of the child" as a guiding principle, see id. n.7. For an
enlightening comparison of policies towards unaccompanied immigrant and refugee
minors among sixteen countries, see Holguin, supra note 176, app. A.
211. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2003).
212. See id. This designation permits the minor to apply for and adjust her
status as a "special immigrant." See id. § 1255.
213. See id. § 1101(a)(27)(J).
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immigrant juvenile (SIJ) is a child who
has been declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the
United States or whom such a court has legally committed to,
or placed under the custody of, an agency or department of a
State and who has been deemed eligible by that court for
long214
term foster care due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment.
Juvenile court jurisdiction to determine the custody status or
placement of such a child is predicated on the Attorney General's
specific consent. 215 Obtaining the Attorney General's consent may
prove difficult. 216 An improved policy should provide immigrant
children with easier access to juvenile courts and state child
welfare services.
Unaccompanied immigrant minors also should be provided
with counsel. In In re Gault,217 the Supreme Court held that a
juvenile is entitled to counsel in delinquency proceedings. 218 The
Court's reasons for its holding are applicable to the situation of
immigrant minors. First, the Court stated that a delinquency
proceeding which subjects a child "to the loss of his liberty for
years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution." 21 9 The
214. Id. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i). A juvenile must also meet two other requirements to
qualify as a special immigrant. Id. The juvenile must be an immigrant present in
the United States
(ii) for whom it has been determined in administrative or judicial
proceedings that it would not be in the alien's best interest to be returned
to the alien's or parent's previous country of nationality or country of last
habitual residence; and
(iii) in whose case the Attorney General expressly consents to the
dependency order serving as a precondition to the grant of special
immigrant juvenile status[.]
Id.
215. See id. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I) (stating that "no juvenile court has jurisdiction
to determine custody status or placement of an alien in the actual or constructive
custody of the Attorney General unless the Attorney General specifically consents
to such jurisdiction"). If a juvenile court issues a dependency order for a minor in
immigration custody before obtaining the Attorney General's consent to the court's
jurisdiction, the order is facially invalid to secure SIJ status. Vikram K. Badrinath,
Challenging the INS on State Court Juvenile Matters, IMMIGR. CURRENT
AWARENESS NEWSL. (Nat'l Immigr. Project of the Nat'l Lawyers Guild), Sept. 16,
2002, at 3 (citing Memorandum from Thomas E. Cook, Acting Assistant
Commissioner, to Regional Directors on Special Immigrant Juveniles (July 9,
1999)).
216. Badrinath, supra note 215, at 3. The District Director in the case's
jurisdiction acts as the consenting official. Id. Amnesty asserts that "[m]any
advocates have reported that the INS hindered or prevented many children seeking
access to this form of relief by denying or delaying decisions regarding consent ....
For example .... until October 2002 the INS in Florida had never given consent for
a child to go to juvenile court." AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2, at 15.
217. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
218. Id. at 36.
219. Id.
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gravity of this outcome is analogous to the prospect of deportation
faced by a child in immigration proceedings. 220 Second, the Court
stated that "the juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope
with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to
insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether

he has a defense and to prepare and submit

it."221

Unaccompanied immigrant juveniles need counsel for each of
Immigrant children usually face complex
these reasons. 222
223
proceedings alone, often in a language they do not understand.
Counsel can guide these children and protect their rights
throughout a foreign, protracted, and difficult immigration
process. 224 Immigrant minors with attorneys are more likely to
attend their hearings 225 and less likely to experience hearing
delays. 226 Counsel is especially critical for the preparation of
defenses to removal proceedings, such as asylum. 227 Children with
valid asylum claims are more than four times as likely to be
granted asylum by an Immigration Judge if they have counsel. 228

220. See Nugent & Schulman, supra note 111, at 1569-70 ("The stakes of these
proceedings are tremendous for children, literally life and death in some
instances.").
221. In re Gault,387 U.S. at 36.
222. See AMNESTY INTL USA, supra note 2, at 62-64. Claire L. Workman argues
that "the requirement of legal counsel satisfies financial, practical, and
humanitarian concerns by ensuring due process of law for unaccompanied minor
aliens." Workman, supra note 175, at 226.
223. AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2, at 62; see Nugent & Schulman, supra
note 111, at 1569 ('These proceedings are administrative and adversarial, pitting
detained children with limited education and English language skills against
trained INS attorneys.").
224. AMNESTY INVL USA, supranote 2, at 62.
225. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 15, ch. 4.
226. See AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2, at 65 (stating that "[o]ne reason why
immigration judges are willing to delay hearings is for efforts to be made for the
child to secure legal representation"); HUM. RTS. WATCH (1998), supra note 19, pt.
IV; OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 15, ch. 4 (noting that "the limited
availability of legal representation" contributes to the delay of EOIR hearings).
227. See HuM. RTS. WATCH (1997), supra note 19, pt. II (stating that without
counsel, detained minors have "little chance of successfully asserting legitimate
legal defenses to deportation"). For a discussion of remedies from removal that
attorneys can pursue on the behalf of unaccompanied immigrant children, see
Nugent & Schulman, supra note 111, at 1582-91. Such remedies include asylum,
withholding of removal, protection under the United Nations Convention Against
Torture, family-based immigration through adjustment of status, and other
administrative remedies outside of immigration court. See id.
228. Nugent & Schulman, supra note 111, at 1569; see AMNESTY INT'L USA,
supra note 2, at 61; OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 15, ch. 4 (stating
that "[piro bono attorneys said some juveniles who were removed might have made
a case for relief, if they had been given time and had been able to find adequate
legal representation").
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229
In sum, as the Supreme Court recognized in Schall v. Martin,
juveniles' right to counsel is an essential safeguard and a requisite
230
of detention hearings.

B. Legislative ProposalI: The UnaccompaniedAlien Child
ProtectionAct IncorporatesJuvenile Justice Policies But
Does Not Address Implementation
In May 2003, Senator Diane Feinstein of California
introduced the Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2003
(UACPA). 231 The bill incorporates some policies of the Flores
Agreement, directly addresses concerns about the mistreatment of
juveniles, and proposes important structural and substantive
changes to the current system. 232 Many provisions of the bill are
commendable. However, the bill's weaknesses are that it proposes
discretionary policies, and does not provide mechanisms to ensure
implementation. This can result in ad hoc policy making. 233 For
this reason, it is questionable whether the bill's reforms would
effectively implement new policies.
1. The UACPA's Treatment Policy Lacks a Specific
Standard
The bill has a general provision related to the treatment of
juvenile detainees. 234 It requires the ORR Director to promulgate
regulations incorporating standards for the conditions of detention
in juvenile placements. 235 These standards should provide for:
appropriate educational services; medical care; mental health
23 6
access to telephones; access to legal services; access to
care;
interpreters; supervision by professionals trained in the care of
children; 237 recreational programs and activities; spiritual and
229. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
230. See id. at 275 (discussing a juvenile's right to counsel while in preventative
detention under the New York Family Court Act); id. at 279 (indicating that the
right to counsel provides an essential safeguard for juveniles).
231. S. 1129, 108th Cong. (2003); 149 CONG. REC. S6981-01 (2003). Senator
Feinstein had introduced a similar bill in 2001. See S. 121, 107th Cong. (2001).
232. See S. 1129, 108th Cong. (2003); 149 CONG. REC. S6981-01 (2003); see supra
Parts IB, D.
233. See Holguin, supra note 176, at 8.
234. See S. 1129 § 103(a)(4)(A), 108th Cong. (2003).
235. Id.
236. This includes the "treatment of trauma, physical and sexual violence, or
abuse." Id. § 103(a)(4)(A)(iii).
237. This provision continues: "taking into account the special cultural,
linguistic, and experiential needs of children in immigration proceedings." Id. §
103(a)(4)(A)(vii).

I,
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religious needs; and dietary needs. 238 The bill further requires
that every child receive notification of the standards both orally
239
and in writing.
The creation of codified standards addressing the specific
needs of unaccompanied immigrant minors is necessary. Human
rights groups have reported that juveniles in INS custody are
often denied access to many services essential to their wellThe bill's mandate that the ORR Director codify
being. 240
treatment standards is therefore crucial.
However, there are two weaknesses in the provision. First,
the promulgation of the regulations is entirely within the
discretion of the ORR Director and the Secretary of the DHS.241
The bill only specifies the areas to be addressed; 242 it does not
provide a minimum standard or a guiding principle for the
standards' development. The second weakness of the provision is
that it fails to specify a deadline for the promulgation of
regulations. 243
A deadline would expedite the issuance of
standards and facilitate systematic redress. Many children will
continue to suffer under deficient policies until official standards
institute improvement.
The UACA also has a specific provision related to the
treatment of juvenile detainees. 244 The bill requires the ORR
Director and the Secretary of the DHS to develop procedures
prohibiting the "unreasonable use" of certain practices. 245 These
practices are: "shackling, handcuffing, or use of other restraints
246
on children; solitary confinement; and pat or strip searches."
The INS used all of these practices routinely and
indiscriminately. 247 Human rights groups describe them as cruel,
248
inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment.

238. Id. § 103(a)(4)(A).
239. Id. § 103(a)(4)(B).
240. See AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2, at 2; HuM. RTS. WATCH (1997), supra
note 19, pt. IV; HUM. RTS. WATCH (1998), supra note 19, pt. IV; supraPart I.C.
241. See S. 1129 § 103(a)(4)(A), 108th Cong. (2003).
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See id. § 103.
245. See id.
246. Id.
247. See AMNESTY INT'L USA, supranote 2, at 2, 32-37; HUM. RTS. WATCH (1997),
supra note 19, pt. IV; HUM. RTS. WATCH (1998), supra note 19, pt. V.
248. See AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2, at 2, 29, 32-37; HUM. RTS. WATCH
(1997), supra note 19, pt. IV; HUM. RTS. WATCH (1998), supra note 19, pt. IV; see
also AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2, at 32 (quoting Rule 67 of the UN Rules for
the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Their Liberty: "All disciplinary measures
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The prohibition on the use of these practices on
unaccompanied immigrant children is necessary. However, the
bill's stipulation that "unreasonable use" be prohibited suggests
that "reasonable use" be allowed. The definition of "unreasonable
24 9
use," made by the ORR Director and the Secretary of the DHS,
may be highly discretionary. For instance, if the decision to use
such practices rests with the official administering them, their use
will be subject to individual discretion. This is not an adequate
safeguard for children who are vulnerable, dependent, and often
250
do not understand the reasons for certain treatment.
Furthermore, the bill fails to stipulate a deadline by which the
prohibitive procedures should be developed. 251 A deadline is
necessary to ensure the prompt curtailment of inappropriate and
As with the promulgation of general
harmful practices.
regulations, the sooner protective standards are set, the sooner the
conditions of juveniles are likely to ameliorate.
2. The UACPA's Release Policy is Promising But
Discretionary
Two important provisions of the UACPA address the transfer
and release of children. 252 First, the bill institutes a time frame
for the transfer of children from U.S. immigration authorities to
the ORR. 25 3 The bill stipulates that unaccompanied immigrant
children should be transferred from the CBP to the ORR no later
than seventy-two hours after apprehension. 254 This requirement
addresses the current problem minors experience in prolonged
immigration custody, by expediting their access to the ORR and its
services.
Second, the UACPA incorporates the Flores Agreement's
prompt release policy. 255 The bill requires that an unaccompanied
constituting cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment shall be strictly prohibited,
including.., closed or solitary confinement or any other punishment that may
compromise the physical or mental health of the juvenile concerned").
249. See S. 1129 § 103(b), 108th Cong. (2003).
250. See AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2, at 29, 32-37; HUM. RTS. WATCH
(1998), supra note 19, pt. IV. The use of these practices as disciplinary measures
was often a result of misunderstandings by immigrant children due to language
barriers. HUM. RTS. WATCH (1998), supra note 19, pt. IV.
251. See S. 1129 § 103(b), 108th Cong. (2003).
252. See id. §§ 101(b)(3)(A), 102(a)(1).
253. See id. § 101(b)(3)(A)(i).
254. Id. Exceptions to this provision are children who have committed crimes
and children who threaten national security. See also § 101(b)(1)(B).
255. Id. § 102(a)(1); see Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 22, pt. VI,
para. 14; supra Part I.B.2.
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child in the ORR's custody "shall be promptly placed" with one of
256
six listed parties, subject to the discretion of the ORR Director.
257
The parties are those established by the Flores Agreement.
While the formal adoption of the Agreement's release policy is
positive, the bill leaves the policy's implementation to the
Discretionary placement of
discretion of the ORR Director.
unaccompanied children will lead to inconsistent and arbitrary
decisions. In light of the INS's restrictive interpretation of the
same release policy, 258 the bill should specify the process of
placement. In addition, the bill should define "promptly" within a
specific time frame to ensure that minors are placed expeditiously.
3. The UACPA's Detention Policy is an Improvement But
Still Discretionary
The UACPA institutes a necessary prohibition on the
commingling of unaccompanied immigrant children with
offenders. 259 It flatly prohibits the detention of non-offender
immigrant minors in adult detention facilities or in facilities
housing delinquent juveniles. 260 This provision would alleviate the
risks associated with commingling, including physical abuse. 261 In
addition, the prohibition comports with the fact that
immigrant minors are held for purely
unaccompanied
administrative reasons, and therefore do not belong in facilities
Although the Flores Agreement prohibits
with offenders.
commingling, the INS had consistently housed minors in secure
262
detention with offenders.
The bill also maintains the "least restrictive setting" of the
Agreement's detention policy. 263 However, it does not provide for
256. S. 1129 § 102(a)(1), 108th Cong. (2003). Placement is subject to the
Director's discretion under his or her duty to protect children from smugglers and
traffickers, and to detain children who have exhibited violent or criminal behavior.

Id.
257. See id.; Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 22, pt. VI, para. 14;
supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
258. See supra Part I.C.2.
259. S. 1129 § 103(a)(1), 108th Cong. (2003).
260. Id. An exception is that a "child who has exhibited a violent or criminal
behavior that endangers others may be detained in conditions appropriate to the
behavior in a facility appropriate for delinquent children." Id. § 103(a)(2).
261. See AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2, at 24-26; OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GEN., supra note 15, ch. 2 (discussing the risks associated with commingling of nondelinquent INS juveniles with delinquent offenders).
262. See Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 22, pt. V, para. 12;
AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2, at 23-24.
263. See S. 1129 § 103(c), 108th Cong. (2003) (stipulating that "[niothing in [the
section on appropriate conditions for detention] shall be construed to supercede
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judicial review of placement decisions. 264 The Flores Agreement
grants children this right as a check upon a discretionary
process. 265 The lack of judicial review under the UACPA leaves
minors without a recourse for challenging detrimental placements.
4. The UACPA Facilitates the Granting of SIJ Status to
Children
The UACPA amends the "special immigrant juvenile"
provision of the INA to increase its application. 26 6 First, the bill
would allow a juvenile court's dependency declaration to be
binding on the Secretary of the DHS. 267 Second, the bill would
delete the requirement of the Attorney General's specific consent
for the exercise of juvenile court jurisdiction. 268 Third, the bill
would allow the ORR to certify that a minor's application for SIJ
269
status is legitimate.
The bill's amendments are promising improvements to the
SIJ process. In particular, the elimination of the Attorney
General's specific consent provision would augment the juvenile
court's exercise of jurisdiction over unaccompanied immigrant
minors. 270 This would connect more children to essential child
welfare resources.
5. The UACPA Offers Children the Important Safeguard of
Counsel
The UACPA grants unaccompanied immigrant minors an
essential safeguard by entitling them to counsel. 271 Under the bill,
procedures favoring release of children ... in the least secure setting possible, as
defined in the ...Agreement under Flores v. Reno"); see also Stipulated Settlement
Agreement, supra note 22, pt. IV, para. 11 (stating that each detained minor shall
be placed "in the least restrictive setting appropriate to the minor's age and special
needs").
264. See S. 1129, 108th Cong. (2003).
265. See Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 22, pt. VII, para. 24.B-D.
266. See S. 1129 § 301, 108th Cong. (2003); supra notes 211-216 and
accompanying text.
267. See S. 1129 § 301, 108th Cong. (2003).
268. See id.
269. See id.
270. See supra notes 211-216 and accompanying text.
271. See S. 1129 § 202(a), 108th Cong. (2003). The bill also establishes a
guardian ad litem program for unaccompanied children.
See id. § 201. A
discussion of a guardian ad litem program is beyond the scope of this Article;
however, it is worth noting that there are differing views on whether guardians ad
litem are appropriate for immigrant juveniles. For example, Holguin makes the
following observation:
Appointing counsel, but not guardians ad litem, for unaccompanied minors
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the ORR Director must ensure that all unaccompanied children
will have "competent counsel to represent them" in immigration
proceedings and matters. 272 This applies to children in the custody
of the ORR or the CBP.273 The bill directs pro bono representation
to be used "to the maximum extent practicable,"' 274 and provides
for government-funded counsel. 275 The guarantee of competent
276
counsel is critical and long overdue.
However, the UACPA's mandatory counsel provision raises
an essential concern about the availability of attorneys to meet the
demand. Pro bono services for unaccompanied immigrant children
are scarce and overused, to the point that they are often
ineffective. 277 Sufficient government funds would have to be
allocated from a greater source than provided for in the bill.278
From an estimated 500 children in immigration detention on any
given day, 279 attorneys and advocates estimate only a small
fraction of them are represented. 280 In addition, governmentraises difficult collateral questions: Who instructs the lawyer as to what
actions to take on behalf of the minor? If the lawyer has unfettered
discretion in this regard, or discretion bounded only by the rules of
professional responsibility, what benefit does appointed counsel offer in
cases where the appropriate course of action is a question of child welfare,
and not law?
Holguin, supra note 176, at 13 n.5. In contrast, Claire L. Workman argues that
"while the proposed appointment of a guardian ad litem may be appropriate for
some children, it may be unnecessary and even invasive to require such a guardian
for all children." Workman, supra note 175, at 226.
272. S. 1129 § 202(a)(1), 108th Cong. (2003).
273. Id.
274. Id. § 202(a)(2).
275. Id. § 202(a)(4). The bill states that the Director "shall enter into contracts
with or make grants to non-profit agencies with relevant expertise in the delivery
of immigration related legal services to children. . . to carry out the responsibilities
of this Act." Id.
276. Advocates for immigrant children's rights have been calling for the
guarantee of counsel for years. See AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2, at 64; HUM.
RTS. WATCH (1998), supra note 19, pt. I; HUM. RTS. WATCH (1997), supra note 19,
pt. I.
277. See AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra note 2, at 62 (stating that "the voluntary
agency attorneys report that only in 'exceptional circumstances' are they able to
represent a juvenile or find a private attorney to take a case on a pro bono basis.
Often the services to children in detention are limited to group presentations of an
explanation of the hearings process and their rights."); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GEN., supra note 15, ch. 4 (stating that "[v]ery few of the pro bono attorneys
actually represented the juveniles in the hearings process").
278. The bill provides that government-funded counsel may be compensated from
Health and Human Services discretionary funds. S. 1129 § 202(a)(3)(C), 108th
Cong. (2003).
279. AMNESTY INT'L USA, supranote 2, at 17.
280. Id. at 61. Amnesty quotes attorney Andrew Morton's testimony before the
U.S. Senate, stating: "Of these nearly 5,000 unaccompanied juveniles apprehended
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funded attorneys will need to have appropriate training in
immigration law to be effective. It is unclear how many qualified
public defenders are available.
C. Legislative ProposalII: A Juvenile Justice Policy Should
Incorporate Specific Principles,Be Implemented by an
Empowered ORR, and Be Subject to Oversight
This legislative proposal addresses the need for specific policy
standards, effective means of implementation, and useful
mechanisms of enforcement. It aims to complement the UACPA's
strengths and ameliorate its weaknesses.
1. A Stronger Policy Should Incorporate Specific Juvenile
Justice Principles
Legislation that improves the current policy toward
unaccompanied immigrant children should incorporate several
additional juvenile justice principles. First, legislation should
In
define the Agreement's treatment policy more precisely.
dignity,
"with
minors
ORR
treat
addition to requiring that the
28
respect and special concern for their particular vulnerability," '
the revised treatment policy should stipulate that the ORR shall
not subject any nonoffenders in its custody to any treatment
administered on criminal offenders. This includes the use of
restraints, excessive discipline, pat or strip searches, and solitary
confinement.
Second, Congress should amend the Agreement's release and
A new policy should explicitly adopt the
detention policies.
JJDPA's mandate that non-naturalized immigrant juveniles "shall
not be placed in secure detention facilities or secure correctional
facilities." 28 2 The Agreement's release provision should continue to
require the ORR to place children in one of the stipulated
placement options 28 3 within three to five days. 28 4 Under the policy,

annually by the INS... as many as 80% appear in an immigration court without
the benefit of a lawyer, guardian ad litem, or assistance or adult assistance of any
kind." Id. (citing Hearings,supra note 112 (testimony of Andrew Morton, Attorney,
Latham & Watkins)). Amnesty also notes that due to the lack of comprehensive
data collected on the number of children with counsel, it is hard to know exactly
how many juveniles are without legal representation. Id.
281. Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supranote 22, pt. IV, para. 11.
282. 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(11)(B) (2003); see supra notes 188-201 and
accompanying text.
283. See Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 22, pt. VI, para. 14; supra
notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
284. See Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 22, pt. VI, para. 15; supra
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minors should remain entitled to judicial review of placement
28 5
decisions.
Third, Congress should include a provision designed to
facilitate unaccompanied immigrant children's access to juvenile
courts and state child welfare resources. 28 6 Congress should
streamline the process of obtaining SIJ status by allowing a
qualified child welfare official to grant consent, or by granting all
unaccompanied immigrant juveniles SIJ status. 28 7 Another way to
bring immigrant minors into juvenile court is to simply grant the
juvenile court jurisdiction for the purpose of administering child
welfare services.
2. A Stronger Policy Should Be Implemented by an
Empowered ORR
Congress should include in its legislation a commitment to
appropriate sufficient funding to the ORR.28
Initial funding
should enable the ORR to comply with federal policy, and
additional funding should enable it to maintain compliance and
extend the benefits of its resources to unaccompanied immigrant
children. 289 In addition, Congress should appropriate separate
funding for counsel appointed for immigrant children at the
government's expense. 290 This includes money for training public
defenders in immigration law.
3.

Stronger Policy Should Be Subject to Oversight

To ensure a quick and effective implementation of this new
policy, Congress should create a task force to monitor the policy's
administration. This body could be composed of federal and state
legislators, private immigration attorneys, state child welfare
officials, refugee social workers, juvenile judges, professors, and
children's advocates. The duties of the task force would include:
monitoring the ORR's compliance with federal policies; reporting
on deficiencies of policy implementation; reporting on the ORR's
need for resources; and proposing solutions to problems. The task
force should issue a comprehensive report on the status of policy

note 72 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 87-91, 265 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 202-216 and accompanying text.
287. Telephone Interview with Holguin, supra note 36. Holguin proposes the
granting of SIJ status to all unaccompanied immigrant minors. Id.
288. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 163-167 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 277-280 and accompanying text.
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implementation annually, and additional reports as it sees fit.
Conclusion
Unaccompanied immigrant children detained by the United
States are victims of a grievous national policy. The INS's failure
to implement the Flores Agreement has stalled reform and
perpetuated mistreatment. Although the transfer of immigrant
children's care to the ORR presents an opportunity for change, it
will not, by itself, effectuate a new policy. This task belongs to
Congress and involves three critical steps. First, Congress must
pass legislation fully incorporating juvenile justice principles for
the treatment, detention, and release of, as well as the
administration of child welfare resources to, unaccompanied
immigrant children. Second, Congress must appropriately fund
the ORR. Third, Congress must create a task force to ensure this
policy's effective implementation.
Unaccompanied immigrant
children have too long been denied the full benefits of juvenile
justice which they deeply deserve.

